The Challenges of the 'Golden Age'

If you read my previous post you'll see that the 'Golden Age' is a very positive time if viewed in certain lights. It wasn't all plain sailing for Britain, though, as this post will explain. If we look at the growth rate from the 1950s to mid 70s, we see it averages around 2.8% per year. Pretty good, higher than during the industrial revolution. But, compare it to the growth rate of other advanced economies and it looks feeble.  In the 1950s we expected these other economies to grow quicker with their scope for 'catch up' growth, but in the 60s many of these economies had actually caught up with and overtaken Britain and were still growing faster.

This suggests there's a fundamental problem somewhere in the British economy. Could it be a problem of investment? We said investment was one of the reasons for Britain's low unemployment in this period, but it could also be part of the reason Britain was lagging behind. Our investment rates had grown since the 1930s, but they were still a way behind other advanced economies. Some blamed this on the policy of 'Stop-Go'. The poorly planned contractions and expansions of demand were too frequent, which left a level of instability that hindered investment. In reality, during the 'Go' phase the demand was pumped into the economy too fast. Prices rise quickly and the government has to quickly backtrack with a deflationary policy that chokes off investment. In the 'Stop' phase firms just help back on their investment, waiting for the next 'Go' phase. The uncertainty of the whole system meant lower investment.

The government needed some alternative methods to raise investment whilst still maintaining their very favourable employment conditions. They didn't want to devalue the sterling and they didn't want to deflate the economy for too long. The only option left was to return to a policy of state planning. A policy of 'Indicative planning' was working well in France so the governments of the early 60s tried to mimic it.

In steps the National Plan! Launched in 1964 by the Labour government with the aim of boosting long term growth up to 4%. A lot of effort was put in to the plan, production targets were set across the board which were needed to achieve the goal. It was all placed under the control of the new 'Department of Economics'. Sound good? It wasn't. It failed. There was no method given to meeting the targets and no penalties for those that didn't make them. It was a naive hope that workers would just cooperate. Well, they didn't. It potentially could have worked, but the whole plan stemmed from a misdiagnosis of the economy's problems. It all assumed that the 'Stop-Go' cycle caused the low investment which hindered growth. What if this wasn't the cause?

Was 'Stop-Go' really the problem? In a way, no. Large fluctuations in the economy that were persistent before 1939 and also occurred after 1973 didn't occur during the 'Golden Age' and a similar policy was used in other countries that were experiencing rapid growth. So was low investment the problem? Britain's investment rates were catching other countries by the 70s, but it was investment in private housing that was holding the rate back. It seemed that Britain was very unproductive compared to its competitors with the same equipment which could have been a deterrent for investment. Investment is seen more and more as a symptom of Britain's decline, rather than a cause of it.

The suggestion from this was that Britain was suffering from other supply side weaknesses. What could these have been? Bad industrial relations, restrictive practices, poor management, poorly aimed research and development and inadequate human capital formation.

Britain's bad industrial relations came partly in the form of strikes. Compared to Germany the strike rate was poor, but compared to the USA it was much better. Productivity was the real issue. Britain's steel productivity was a 1/3 of the EEC average. We were over-manning our factories with people putting in little effort. Top managers in large industry seemed to be completely oblivious to shop floor activities.

Research and development was one of the big problems too. Britain was spending more than all other Western economies bar the USA, with half of this coming from the private sector. The direction of this spending was an issue. It was being spent on defence, civil nuclear power and civil aerospace - three unprofitable and poor commercial areas. All of the most talented scientists and technical manpower were stuck in dead end projects not adding  much to the GDP of the country. Innovation was falling too.

Another one of the supply-side issues was education. We were a comparatively uneducated economy. Only half our factor directors had degrees, the figure was closer to 90% if you looked abroad. It was even worse at middle management level. Those managers that did have degrees tended to have them in arty subjects and not managerial subjects.

So, if these really are the problems causing low growth - why did they persist? You'd assume that market forces would create change and push the inefficient parts of the economy out. The explanation for this is put down to 'Institutional sclerosis'. Key power structures had been left undisturbed for such a period of time that they had become entrenched. Vested interests were created and these resisted change. A part of this can be put down to the little damage Britain took during war. If we compare it to Germany, who took a lot of damage, we see why. Germany's war damage forced them to rethink the whole economy, they kept their strengths and replaced their weaknesses. With Britain, this didn't happen and institutions were left entrenched. The world boom then further lessens Britain's incentive to change.

The government were also very reluctant to generate the required change. They didn't want to challenge the vested interests in competition policy and preferred to follow the path of 'Stop-Go' and not detailed economic intervention. Another reason the government didn't force change is perhaps the problems weren't as bad as first implied. This was the view of some historians. There were some positives: our research and development spending was similar to France and they were growing rapidly. We looked good in industries such as pharmaceuticals and food and drink. Globally, Britain's incomes were in line with the OECD average and the economy was still successful. The only real negative was the loss of global political influence.

To conclude, the 'Golden Age' is a period that can be argued to have been good and bad for Britain. The debate about the extent and causes of the failures I've detailed above will continue for many years to come. Britain does lose ground, but is still a successful economy.

The 'Golden Years'

Once World War 2 had come to an end, the government had a changed view on the economy. There was a unanimous agreement that the economy could not be returned to the conditions of the 1930s. A prime opportunity had presented itself for economic betterment to take place. The war experience could fuel this improvement along with breakthroughs in Keynesian economic theory.

In weighing up what exactly the government could do to improve the economy from the 1930 levels, three main areas appear. Firstly, could they try a policy of nationalisation? The short answer to this was no. Many key industries were already under national control, such as steel, coal and the railways and most other important industries were so highly regulated already that nationalising them completely would have been ineffective. So, the policy of nationalisation was crossed off the list. Could they try and raise public spending? Well, in reality - not really. Public spending was already high at 37% of GDP in 1948, most of this going on social safety nets rather than boosting the economy. Any further public spending would be unsustainable. There goes public spending off the list. The option that was chosen was macroeconomic management.

The 1950s was a period of breakthrough for Keynesian theory. It saw the policy of demand management come to flourish - or better known: 'Stop-Go'. The idea behind this policy was constant tweaking of the economy to keep it heading in the right direction and to avoid overheating or recession. When unemployment began to rise, the government would loosen policy and when the economy looked like it was overheating the government would tighten policy again. Did it work? Eh... In some senses, yes, in most other senses, not really. If you place a high priority on unemployment then it could be passed as a success - unemployment reached historically low levels and fluctuated around the 1.5-2.5% mark. Living standards also rose. However, this was at the cost of frequent balance of payment crises, slower growth than the UK's major competitors and inflation (although not runaway inflation).

The policy had a famous critic in the form of the economist RCO Matthews. He had his doubts about Keynesian theory. The basic thrust of his argument was that the reason unemployment was so low wasn't to do with the policy the government had implemented - this policy only affected unemployment at the margin. He claimed that demand was higher than pre-war levels, but not because of financial policy. Tax was higher than spending, budgetary policy tended to be deflationary and interest rates were consistently higher in the 50s.

So what could the other reasons for the low unemployment be? Some have put it down to high investment rates. Investment was especially higher than in 1939 and most of it was coming from the private sector. Investment is a fickle economic variable that depends a lot on confidence. From 1950-1973 there was a world economic boom which is the reason for this high investment. In Europe and Asia, war had hit harder than in the US. This left a lot of scope for 'catch up' growth to repair the war damage using the best practice techniques. Many workers also moved into more productive sectors such as services instead of agriculture. As well as this, world trade barriers come down and the Bretton Woods system begins to function efficiently as the USA pump the system with overseas aid and defence spending. Overall, world demand increases which fuels investment and productivity growth. This growth in world trade in a way drags the British economy along with it.

Another contributory factor for the higher investment comes from Broadberry. Productivity rises were higher than wage rises which favours job creation. As well as this, wage restraints continued through the 1960s, essentially increasing firms profits allowing investment to take place. The wage restraints were supplemented by cheaper imports of food and raw materials to keep living standards rising.

We can conclude the 'Golden Age' by saying that, yes, full employment was pretty much achieved, but it wasn't all down to the wonders of government policy. They were helped a great deal by very favourable conditions around the world. With hindsight, we can also see that this is only a temporary purple patch for Britain as problems begin to crop up. 

The Circular Flow Of Income

*I'd like to start by wishing everyone a happy new year! I hope you all had a good time over the festive period and are getting back into the swing of things as life returns to normal. I've had a great 4 week break and am now back studying, which mean the blog will be starting again on a consistent basis until Easter!*

Today's focus will be on the circular flow of income. I'm aware this has already been discussed but like I mentioned in a previous post I do plan on going over things again in a little more depth. The best way to learn about the circular flow of income is to actually see the flow graphically:

I'll now break the flow down into it's different sections, starting with the inner flow. The inner flow consists of the factors payments going from the firm to the households and payments for goods (consumption) flowing in the opposite direction. Firms pay money to households in the form of wages, interest and rent in return for the services of these factors of production. On the other side, households pay money to firms when they consume the firms goods and services. Note we're talking only about domestic firms and domestic households here.

In a scenario where all money was spent then that would complete the flow. However, in reality, not all money is spent. This is where the concepts of injections and withdrawals from the flow come in. Withdrawals are exactly what they sound like: money being taken out of the flow. It comes in three main forms. Firstly, savings. When money is deposited in banks or other financial institutions for the future that money has been withdrawn from the flow. Taxation is another withdrawal. Income tax and national insurance comes out of a households income whereas VAT comes out of a households consumption. Receiving benefits from the government is essentially a 'negative tax'. It's a tax that is flowing in the opposite direction. Therefore the total withdrawal in the form of net taxes is total taxation minus benefit payments. The final withdrawal is import spending. This is money that has left the flow of income because it is spent on goods and services abroad.

Injections, defined as additional money flowing into the economy, also comes in three forms. Firstly: investment. Investment is money that firms spend after gaining it through financial institutions. Secondly there is government spending. This includes such things as spending on roads, hospitals, schools and the like. It does not include state benefits, that is important to note! Finally, the other injection is export spending. Money that has come from people abroad buying our domestic goods and services.

There is a slight relationship between the withdrawals and injections into the circular flow of income. For example, suppose more money is saved (withdrawal) then more money will be available for banks to lend out to firms for investment (injection). The higher taxation is (withdrawal), the more like the government are to increase spending (injection). However, we must remember that these choices are made by different people. The choice to save and the choice to invest are made by two completely different, independent parties and therefore each will have their own agenda. Due to this we can say that injections may not equal withdrawals, however they could.

The final point I'd like to discuss here is equilibrium in the circular flow if income. Like most things in economics, market forces are able to bring the circular flow to equilibrium. I'll give an example. Suppose that injections exceed withdrawals. This may be because investment has rise, but irrespective of the reason due to  this national income will rise (because of more money circulating). A higher national income means that people can consume more, but as well as this people can also save more, pay more taxes and buy more imports. Therefore withdrawals will rise, and continue to rise up to a point where it is equal to injections. This is when equilibrium has been reached and national income will remain constant until another change occurs.

Thank you for reading guys and girls. Contact me if you have any questions or feedback, have a good day/night! Sam.

The Transformation of Policy Between the Wars

Immediately after the First World War, the government's aim for policy was to get the economy back to the 'normality' experienced prior to 1914. This sort of thing included the government playing a limited role in the economy, more integration with the world economy and restoration of the gold standard, free trade and a balance budget.

Initially these three final points are achieved. The budget is eventually balanced, albeit a higher budget than previous years due to the increase social spending and maintenance of the national debt. During the 1920's the policy of free trade is also pretty much restored. Britain gets back on the gold standard in 1925 at the rate of £1 = $4.86. Germany and France both rejoin the gold standard at a similar time, along with most other leading economies. Why did we return to the gold standard you may ask? Well, firstly it helped achieve the restoration of pre-war 'normality'. Also, it aimed to try and stabilise the currency which would in turn help out trade. Another feature of the gold standard was to allow the monetary system to function on its own. What I mean by this, is that if the country runs a payments surplus then gold will flow into the country, interest rates will be decreased so wages and prices will fall. This will in turn cure the surplus. It also works the opposite way for a payments deficit. A final point is that the gold standard was a means of stopping politicians from meddling with the money supply!

However, pre 1914 the gold standard worked but after the war and during the 1920's it just didn't. There is a list of potential reasons for this:

• Why the gold standard worked pre-1914:
• It was developed gradually over time.
• Capital and labour was freely moving.
• The central bank could use interest rates to protect the currency, independent of the government. 
• London was still a financial centre.

• What changed in the 20's?
• There was a rush to return to the gold standard.
• More protectionism and less migration due to barriers.
• Central banks were under pressure from politicians.
• Paris and New York now competing against London as financial centres. 

Mr. Keynes pops up again in this debate. He pointed out that British prices had risen faster than the US', so starting at the same £1 = $4.86 rate would be an overvaluation of the pound. Although this shouldn't have matter because the gold standard should re-adjust prices, Keynes doubted it would work. He thought it would have bad domestic effects including interest rates needing to be kept at 4.5-4.5% and due to this borrowing would become expensive and investment would suffer.

The world slump is the next chronological step in the economic history of Britain. The recession of 1929 - 1931 started because of the Wall Street Crash in the US. This meant massive balance of payments problems. In 1931 came the European Banking Crisis and so in Autumn of that year Britain was forced off of the gold standard. This was first portrayed as a temporary change, but gradually the realisation came about that it was for good. Interest rates were cut to 2% to encourage borrowing and investment which would boost the economy again! Amazingly, there was a recovery. GDP rose as investment rose and Britain actually now compared well with other global economies. It would be easy to say all of this was because of the gold standard, but it isn't true as many other factors were also contributing to the recovery of the British economy. What the slump did cause, however, is the abandonment of free trade between 1931 and 1932. 

Keynes had the idea that investment from the government was something that was necessary for the economy. But, the treasury wasn't in agreement with this theory. They believed it would unsettle foreign investors and worsen the national debt. Keynes thought that there was no point in cutting wages because demand and consumption would suffer. What was needed was public investment which would boost the economy via the multiplier effect. The treasury argued it would be inflationary and any more borrowing would get out of control. The only time borrowing was allowed was in a one-off circumstance for rearmament!

Thanks for reading again guys, that'll be it for economic history for a while... I promise! Haha.

Sam. 

Britain and the International Economy, 1870 - 1914

During the period from 1870 up to the start of the First World War in 1914 the British economy changed a lot. As well as this, the international economy as a whole had a spectacular change around so that conditions in 1870 in no way matched those in 1914. Firstly, world trade was growing. The rate at which it was growing was outstripping world output which shows the industrialisation, falling transport costs and mass emigration that was happening across the globe. In Britain, trade grew 35 fold over the 19th century.

Let's focus more on Britain now. Foreign Trade stayed fairly constant in the time period given, in terms of the fact it was at 30% of GNP in 1870s and also at this level in 1913. As a bit of background, it was at 10% in the 1830s and 17% in the 1850s. During 1870 and 1913 foreign trade as a percentage of GNP did fall, but it recovered just before the First World War. The majority of this foreign trade was in the form of manufactured goods, although it was declining. For example, 56% of exports in 1870 were textiles but textiles only made up 37% in 1910. As far as imports go, we imported a lot of food and raw materials because we weren't self sufficient in these, apart from coal.

We'll move on to the balance of payments position for Britain now. Before 1914, imports exceeded exports. Exports of goods only made up two thirds of our imports between 1870 and 1900. However, it wasn't all bad because Britain had a very sophisticated 'invisible' sector for this time; this comprised of business services and overseas investment. With the exports of these included in the mix Britain actually ran a surplus which increased between 1851 and 1913. We have many reasons as to why a lot of funds were leaving the country in terms of these 'invisible' goods, they are split into two groups: 'pushing' funds out factors and 'pulling factors'.

'Pushing' funds out factors are basically the factors in Britain that meant it was in the best interests of investors to send their money abroad. They include:

•  The safe investments in Britain gave very poor returns compared to the equivalent abroad.
• High return investments in Britain were all very high risk.

The other factors are called 'pulling' factors. These are factors that come from the countries abroad that encourage investment. They include:

• Large infrastructure spending abroad because of industrialisation. 
• Overseas governments were issuing bonds with returns of 4-5% in comparison to the 2% return in Britain.

Britain played a vital role in the world balance of payments during this time period as well. We ran deficits with industrial countries and surpluses with the primary producers. So, we were in deficit to countries such as the USA but ran surpluses with countries in Asia and South America. 

Some contempories came to the conclusion that Britain was in a weak position at the time. They argued that Britain's share of world exports was falling and they were beginning to import more and more manufactured goods. The British exporters were falling behind in more advanced products. They had solutions, however. They felt British business needed to be more efficient in their production techniques to make them competitive on the world market again. They also felt that government policy was to blame, especially free trade. The idea behind free trade was that it would maximise the wealth of all nations by the theory of comparative advantage, and this in turn would maintain Britain's dominant position in the world economy. However, most major economies didn't adopt it and the protectionist countries actually grew faster than Britain after 1870. 

I'll round things off there. Basically, we can conclude that from 1870 to 1914 Britain was comparatively having a bit of a rough period. It kept a surplus on its balance of payments and was still very much a key player in the world economy. But, other countries were catching up. Britain had lost its place as the dominant exporter of manufactured goods and was adopting policies (free trade) that weren't effective. Next I'll move on to the interwar period of the British economy to see how that changed. Thanks for reading!

Sam. 

Debate: Thoughts on U.K Foreign Aid

Quick point I'd like to discuss in today's post is the foreign aid given out by the United Kingdom and whether it's justified. The form of aid I'm most focusing on here is 'Official Development Assistance'. It comes in many different forms, not just lump sums of cash, and it represents one of the financial flows received by the so called 'developing economies'.

In many cases I'm sure this aid is very much necessary. For example, a case I think the aid is necessary is to Ethiopia. In 2007, Ethiopia received $273 million in Official Development Assistance from the United Kingdom. In that same year, the GDP per capita in that country by PPP was $779, making Ethiopia a very poor country. They also had a Human Development Index rating of 0.414 which is a low score, bearing in mind in 2012 the United Kingdom posted a rating of 0.863. I feel in this scenario, the aid is justified because they need capital to help their economy grow, and with such little money to start out with they'd have been getting nowhere without such aid. Another fairly decent example of justified ODA is to Afghanistan who had a HDI rating of 0.352 in 2007. However, this does lead me on to the main argument I have against foreign aid. It's all well and good it being justified, but is the money going to where it needs to go?

Lots of these less economically developed countries are like that for a reason. Whether it be corrupt government, lack of resources or whatever. Donating lump sums of money to countries with a corrupt government is just a pure waste of capital. The money will be thrown about to fund lavish lifestyles for those in favour of the government with very little being invested into the people living in poverty and on expanding the economy. This is a big put off against ODA in my opinion. The money needs to be directed at precisely the places that need it, there's no use giving it to governments if the money will not be invested efficiently. Furthermore, adding on to this point is the fact that are we not partly to blame for the money not being invested wisely? It doesn't take a rocket scientist to work out that if the money is invested into the economy and the economy grows, the aid will stop. Living off the aid is an easy way out for these developing countries and they may be using that as an incentive not to expand their economies. The over-reliance on aid would soon become apparent when it stops and the developing countries start to crumble again. It seems the aid that has been throw around has placed the world in a bit of a catch 22. Keep investing money in the form of aid and the money is not all used efficiently, or stop the aid and watch countries fall further into poverty. Dilemma, in my opinion.

What's more is that it's not like our country is a perfect example. We throw all this money away to other countries without a second thought about the issues we have regarding poverty and a dwindling economy. I know that we feel there is an obligation to Commonwealth countries or an expectation that at some point in the future we'll be rewarded with great trading deals from these countries when they finally develop, but i think it has to be toned down. The money needs to be re-invested directly into our own country in times like these until we can reach the point where we can say 'Yes, our economy is running smoothly and the people are happy'. If that ever happens, who knows?

I guess I wouldn't have as much of a problem if the amount we plan to give in foreign aid didn't grow anymore, but that isn't the case.

Notice here, virtually all government departments in the United Kingdom were planned to be cut by 2014-2015 and that money basically sent out in the form of foreign aid. How that can be justified i do not know! Our economy is shrinking, taking more money out of it doesn't seem at all logical in my mind. Believe it or not, though, in 2007 we gave almost $1 billion of ODA to China and India, the two economies that will be dominating the world potentially in the coming years. Of course they do have problems, but we have problems too.

I'll tie it up there, I think my opinion on foreign aid has become very clear in this post. But that's all it is, my opinion. What do you think? Thanks for reading!

Exchange Rates (Macroeconomics)

Exchange rates are something that affects all of us, be it directly or indirectly. Exchange rates are basically the value of a currency compared to that of another currency. They fluctuate a lot, which leads to price changes.

I'll be using the Sterling (£) in my examples throughout. Firstly, let's look at what determines the value of a currency. The value of the £ is determined by the free market, so therefore the powers of demand and supply dictate the value of the £. The majority of the demand for the £ will come from trading partners demanding the U.K's exports and therefore needing the £ to buy them. The majority of the supply of the £ comes from us demanding foreign imports, and needing to sell the £ to get foreign currency to buy the imports.

An increase in the demand for the £ will increase the value compared to other currencies. This is often referred to as a "strengthening of the £" or an "appreciation". Obviously, a fall in demand for the £ will have the opposite effect. An increase in the supply of the £ will decrease the value compared to other currencies. This is often known as a "weakening of the £" or a "depreciation". A decrease in supply will have the opposite effect, raising the value.

Another key factor that influences the demand and supply of the £ is interest rates. If interest rates in the U.K. are high, then we will see a high demand for the £ as people will make a better return off of it in U.K. banks. This will increase the value of the currency. A decrease in interest rates will see money flow out of the U.K. in search of a better return on their investment and therefore demand and the value of the £ will fall.

There are two different exchange rate mechanisms. The first one is the floating mechanism. This is when the value of the currency is determined by the free market - the powers of demand and supply. The advantage of this mechanism is that theoretically the exchange rate should automatically adjust which will eliminate any imbalances withing the Balance of Payments. The other is the fixed mechanism. This is when the exchange rate is fixed and determined by the government or central bank of a country. The bonus to this is that it gives more stability to the value of the currency but runs the risk of goods becoming to un-competitive if it's too high or the market can be flooded if it's too low.

That's the lot for exchange rates, thanks. Also, any requests for what to come next? Post it in comments and ill see what i can do. Thanks for reading, follow the blog if you enjoy!

The Circular Flow of Income (Macroeconomics)

The circular flow of income is basically exactly what it says it is, it shows the flow of income around the economy. It is best shown visually using this diagram:

This diagram shows the circular flow of income around the economy, as well as the flow of goods and factors of production. We can see "Rent, wages and profit" travelling from the firms to households. These are all payments for the factors of production you can see flowing in the opposite direction, from households to firms, next to the arrow. "Payment for goods and services" is flowing from households to firms and as you can see on the arrow next to that, goods and services are travelling in the opposite direction. So from this we can see that money flows around the economy in a circular motion, from firms to households and back to the firms again.

However, this would assume that no more money ever enters or leaves the economy, which we know is almost always untrue. So therefore, we can add a few more things to the diagram. Firstly injections into the economy. Injections means money being put into the economy from an external source. The three main types of injection and government spending, exports and investment. All three of these add additional money into the circular flow of income. Secondly leakages from the economy. This means money that exits the economy for one reason or another. The three main types of leakages are taxation, imports and savings. All these three factors reduce the amount of money in the circular flow of income.

That's it for the basics on the circular flow of income. Thanks for reading, sorry about the delay.

Aggregate Demand - Investment (Macroeconomics)

Right, investment is another of the components that makes up aggregate demand as a whole. It is often referred to as just (I). It basically takes into account firms investing money into their business, which normally occurs when they expect that return of their investment to be larger than the investment itself - or more basically put if there is profit available to be made.

There are many influences on this factor, it is also the most volatile component and therefore fluctuates a lot depending on the economic climate and other factors. Here are the influences:

• Corporation Tax - This plays a major part in how much investment is made. Corporation tax is a tax on business' profits. So, the lower the tax the more likely firms are to invest as they will be likely to keep a larger percentage of the profit created from the investment. 
• Interest Rates - This is also a large influencing factor. Interest rates generally dictate the amount paid back on loans. So if the interest rates are low then firms can expect to take out a loan without having to pay as much back in comparison to if interest rates were high. This would be an incentive for firms to increase their investment. Obviously, if interest rates were higher then firms would be discouraged from investing as much.
• Price of Capital Equipment - Investment is all about firms spending money on capital equipment to expand their output. If the capital equipment is cheap, then firms are more likely to invest in it knowing that they will be able to increase profits potentially at a lower cost. 
• Profit Levels - This may influence a firms willingness to invest. If a firm has a high profit level already, they will feel more comfortable investing as they have more money to throw around. However if profit levels are very low then the firm will be taking more of a risk investing money and may be discouraged from doing so.

These are the main factors that influence the level of investment in an economy. Other minor factors include changes in real disposable income, expectations and advances in technology. 

That's the lowdown on investment.. Next up will be government spending. Thanks for reading. 

Aggregate Demand (Macroeconomics)

Well, the first post on a macroeconomic topic. I'll start with the very basics - aggregate demand.

Aggregate demand, often shortened to just AD, is the total demand for goods and services in an economy at a given price level. No longer are we looking at just individual markets, but the demand in the economy as a whole. When we say price level, we are referring to the average price of products produced in the economy. Price levels go up and we have inflation, which will be explained in a later post.

Aggregate demand is made up of 5 components. These 5 components are consumer expenditure (C), investment (I), government spending (G) and net exports [exports (X) - imports (M)]. Therefore, aggregate demand equals C + I + G + (X - M). Each component will be detailed individually in later posts, but i'll give a brief description of each here.

• Consumer expenditure - This is often called consumption, it is spending by households on products and generally makes up the biggest proportion of aggregate demand. 
• Investment - This is spending on capital goods, such as machinery and delivery vehicles. It's the most volatile component. 
• Government spending - This is government injecting money into economy through spending on things such as the NHS. 
• Exports - Simply put, the value of goods we sell abroad.
• Imports - The opposite of above, the value of goods we buy from abroad.

So, each of these components make up the overall value of aggregate demand. The next post will look at consumer expenditure. Thanks.